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I. INTRODUCTION
With the passage of time and the advent of unforeseen ad-
vances in technology, constitutional law faces new challenges. Over
the past half century, major breakthroughs in communications
technology have greatly expanded the breadth of human commu-
nication. The Internet is the latest of these revolutions in commu-
nications. The Internet provides an unprecedented level of access
to persons who wish to state their point of view or sell their goods
or services. The rising level of speech on the Internet, some of it
raw and harsh, spurred the inevitable calls for regulation, civility
and censorship. In response, Congress reacted with the Communi-
cations Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). The United States Supreme
Court responded by declaring the CDA unconstitutional and firmly
stated that communications over the Internet are entitled to the
full protection of the First Amendment. As a result, disputes over
domain names, "cybergriping," and web page content are guided
t Eric D. Paulsrud is a shareholder in the law firm of Leonard, Street and
Deinard. Mr. Paulsrud practices in the areas of trademark and media law, particu-
larly as those fields of practice relate to business on the Internet.
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by First Amendment principles.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
There have been three major technological innovations over
the past five hundred years that have radically transformed the dis-
semination of information and the power of the speaker. The first
major transformation was Gutenberg's invention of movable type
for the printing press and the printing of the Gutenberg Bible over
500 years ago. The movable type printing press not only eased the
ability to make copies, but also radically changed the power of
speakers and allowed them to reach a vastly expanded audience
through the medium of printed works.
The second major revolution was the advent of electronic
broadcasting. Radio and television further expanded the reach of
speakers, but still at a relatively high cost to the speaker. Both of
these prior revolutions also quickly developed to interpose editorial
control over the message.
The third major revolution was the Internet. Unlike the prior
two revolutions, the Internet revolution has virtually no barrier to
entry to any speaker wishing to set forth his or her viewpoint. With
those barriers down, businesses face increasing attacks from unfa-
miliar quarters. Such challenges to a company's reputation and
brand were extremely rare when the speaker was faced with the
high cost barriers posed by the print and broadcast media. "Each
new media, as it was introduced, changed the balance of power in
the constitutional equation involving the First Amendment." The
Internet permits both sophisticated businesses and the activist gad-
fly nearly equal opportunity to convey their message across the en-
tire Internet. In addition, virtually all editorial controls have been
removed.
III. THE INTERNET AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court has recognized the dramatic impact of the
Internet in widely opening the opportunity for expressive speech.
This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication
includes not only traditional print and news services, but
also audio, video and still images, as well as interactive,
real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any
person with a phone line can become a town crier with a
1. Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
[Vol. 27:31638
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voice that resonates farther than it could from any soap-
box. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and
newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphle-
teer .... [T]he content on the Internet is as diverse as
human thought.2
A. Obscene Speech
As with other mediums before it, the level of First Amendment
protection to be afforded the new medium of the Internet was de-
cided in the context of obscene and indecent speech. "Obscene
materials have been denied the protection of the First Amendment
because their content is so offensive to contemporary moral stan-
dards."' "Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is
protected by the First Amendment."4 The government is pressured
to regulate "indecent" expression in each new medium.
1. Broadcast Media
The Supreme Court observed that "[e] ach new medium of ex-
pression ... may present its own problems. " ' With the emergence
of the radio and television broadcast media, the Supreme Court
recognized special justifications for the regulation of the broadcast
media that are not applicable to print media.6 As a result, material
that would be acceptable in other contexts may be prohibited from
broadcast on the public airwaves.
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,7 the Supreme Court held that the
FCC could regulate speech which was merely indecent but not ob-
scene. George Carlin's comedy monologue of Seven Filthy Words,
admittedly protected speech, could therefore be regulated on the
public airwaves. The factors that the Supreme Court relied on in
upholding this restriction on speech in the public broadcast me-
dium are: (1) an extensive history of Government regulation in the
2. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
3. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978); see also Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957).
4. Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1975).
5. S.E. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975).
6. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (upholding FCC regula-
tion of "obscene, indecent, or profane" language used in public broadcast me-
dium); see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (upholding
FCC regulation requiring broadcasters to permit response time to subjects of criti-
cism).
7. 438 U.S. at 748.
1639
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broadcast medium, (2) the scarcity of available frequencies, and
(3) the invasive nature of the medium.s
2. The Communications Decency Act Of 1996
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) 9 was Con-
gress' attempt to regulate indecent speech on the Internet. The
CDA sought to prohibit the transmission of obscene or indecent
messages or "patently offensive" messages to persons under 18
years of age. The Supreme Court found the CDA unconstitutional
in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union because the factors justifying
the regulation of public broadcast media were "not present in cy-
berspace."' 2 The Court also found that the argument that govern-
ment's interest in protecting children justified the restriction on
speech intended for adults was unpersuasive.
[T]hat interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad
suppression of speech addressed to adults. As we have
explained, the Government may not reduc[e] the adult
population ... to ... only what is fit for children.
[R]egardless of the strength of the government's interest
in protecting children, [t]he level of discourse reaching a
mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be
suitable for a sandbox.1
3
The Supreme Court has plainly ruled that the Internet is to re-
ceive the same broad level of First Amendment protection that the
traditional print media has enjoyed. The Court stated "our cases
provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scru-1. ,,14
tiny that should be applied to this medium. The special factors
justifying closer regulation of broadcast media do not apply to the'5
Internet. As a result, the Internet presents and will continue to
present a "rough and tumble" environment for presenting oppos-
ing views and opinions. That does not mean, however, that the
Internet is an open forum with no restrictions on expression. Just
8. Reno, 521 U.S. at 867.
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)-(e) (2000).
10. Id. § 223(a).
11. Id. § 223(d).
12. Reno, 521 U.S. at 847.
13. Id. at 875 (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 759 (1996); Bolger v. Young Drugs Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,
74-75 (1983); Sable Communications of Cal., 492 U.S. at 128).
14. Reno, 521 U.S. at 869.
15. Id. at 868-69.
1640 [Vol. 27:3
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as the First Amendment has boundaries in other media, it also has
boundaries on the Internet.
B. False And Deceptive Speech
Just as with any other media, false or deceptive speech does
not enjoy First Amendment protection on the Internet. Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes recognized that "[t] he most stringent pro-
tection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire
in a theatre and causing a panic. 16 The application of the truthful
or deceptive principle for the protection of speech can bring some
general harmony to a number of disputes involving brands used in
domain names, metatags, and search engines. A growing body of
precedent has established that trademarks cannot be used or mis-
used as domain names when the intent of the domain name holder
is to deceive the audience. It is equally important, however, to rec-
ognize that the use of a trademark by someone other than the
trademark owner in a domain name can be expressive speech and
therefore protected by the First Amendment.
Domain names ... per se are neither automatically enti-
tled to nor excluded from the protections of the First
Amendment, and the appropriate inquiry is one that fully
addresses particular circumstances presented with respect
to each domain name. Whether a particular domain
name is entitled to protection under the First Amend-
ment depends on the extent of its communicative mes-
sage.
Thus, use of another's trademark is entitled to First Amendment
protection when the use of the mark is part of a communicative
18message.
Use of the mark as part of the domain name for the purpose of
deceiving Internet users into accessing a web site not associated
with the trademark owner is not entitled to protection under the
First Amendment. 9 For example, a person opposing the views of
the organization 'Jews for Jesus" could not use the domain name
'Jews for Jesus" to deceive a person who is looking for information
16. Shenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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20on the legitimate organization. Planned Parenthood won a simi-
lar victory over the owner of plannedparenthood.com who sought
21to present an opposing viewpoint by misleading Internet users.
Likewise, the organization, Persons for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals, commonly known as PETA-successfully blocked and
forced the transfer of the domain name "peta.org" to the legitimate
organization. 2 "Peta.org" had been used by an individual who op-
posed PETA's viewpoint and claimed that his use of the acronym
stood for "Persons Eating Tasty Animals." This humorous jibe at
PETA's views did not obviate the fact that the use of "peta.org"
misdirected individuals looking for the original organization.
In each of these examples a visitor to the deceptive site would
quickly realize the deception and would not likely be confused for
any appreciable amount of time. The courts were not impressed
with this argument. Each of the domain names was used in a de-
ceptive manner to misdirect Internet users seeking the genuine
site. In addition, the domain name in each of these examples did
not itself contain an expressive message; the domain names were
simply the trademarks of the company. "Use of another entity's
mark is entitled to First Amendment protection when [the] use of
that mark is part of a communicative message, not when it is used
to identify the source of a product.,23
In these cases, the domain names actually "mis-identified" the
source of the web page that the user accessed. While each of the
web sites themselves contained speech normally protected by the
First Amendment, the deceptive nature by which the legitimate
company's name was used for the domain name was not entitled to
receive First Amendment protection. In each of these examples
the plaintiff's mark could have been used as part of a domain if the
use of the mark had been used as part of a nondeceptive expressive
message.
20. Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998), affd, 159 F.3d
1351 (3rd Cir. 1998).
21. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629, 1997
WL 133313, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997), afj'd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 525 U.S. 834 (1998).
22. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F.
Supp. 2d 915 (E.D. Va. 2000).
23. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc., 1997 WL 133313, at *10; see also Mor-
rison & Forester LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1134 (D. Colo. 2000).
1642 [Vol. 27:3
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C. Cybergriping
These examples of a deceptive use of a company's name
should be contrasted with nondeceptive use of a company's name
in a domain name.
[D]omain names may be employed for a variety of pur-
poses, both functional and expressive elements, ranging
from the truly mundane street address or telephone
number-like identification of the specific business that is
operating the web site, to commercial speech and even
core political speech squarely implicating First Amend-
ment concerns.
Where the domain name uses the company's brand in such a
manner that it is expressive and not likely to deceive a consumer,
the First Amendment may prohibit the trademark owner from
wresting away the domain name or otherwise shutting down a site
that is engaged in protected speech. This is what happened to
Bally Total Fitness when a disgruntled former member began using
25the phrase "Bally Sucks" in his domain name. Even if the criti-
cisms of Bally were unjustified, Justice Brandeis long ago stated, "if
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fal-
lacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy to
be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.",26 This enduring
principle of more speech versus restricting speech is a valued prin-
ciple in First Amendmentjurisprudence.
"Registering domain names in the form of [company
name]sucks.com to provide a forum for critical commentary is not
uncommon and is part of an Internet phenomenon known as 'cy-b . • ,,,27
bergriping. For a continuing example of this principle, simply
go to walmartsucks.com. While Wal-Mart does not appear to have
challenged the owner of walmartsucks.com, the company has been
successful in an administrative Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP) proceeding28 against the registrants of
24. Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 585 (2d Cir.
2000).
25. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1162
(C.D. Cal. 1998).
26. Id. at 1166.
27. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 536 n.9 (E.D.
Va. 2000).
28. On October 24, 1999, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) approved the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Pol-
icy (UDRP). The sole function of this policy is to resolve disputes between trade-
1643
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walmartcanadasucks.com, wal-martcanadasucks-.com, walmartuk-
29
sucks.com and walmart-puertoricosucks.com. Wal-Mart was suc-
cessful against the registrant of these domain names because the
UDRP Panel found the domain names were not registered "in or-
der to express opinions or to seek the expression of opinions of
others. The record indicates that [the registrant's] intention was to
extract money from [Wal-Mart] ."
Two relatively new federal statutes have been enacted to give
trademark owners greater protection of their mark: the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act31 and the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (ACPA).S Both of these statutes provide protection
3
for First Amendment speech . The UDRP also recognizes a de-
mark holders and domain name registrants. The policy is effectively incorporated
into every generic top level domain (gTLD) (e.g. .com, .net and .org) registration.
ICANN is the non-profit corporation that was formed in October 1998 to take over
responsibility for the IP address space allocation, protocol parameter assignment,
domain name system management, and root server system management functions
performed under United States government contract by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (LANA) and other entities. ICANN, Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.
htm (approved Oct. 24, 1999).
29. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Walsucks and Walmart Puerto Rico, Case No.
D2000-0477 (WIPO, July 20, 2000), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/ deci-
sions/html/d2000-0477.html.
30. Id.; see also Nat'l Westminster Bank PLC v. Purge I.T., Case No. D2000-
0636 (WIPO, Aug. 13, 2000), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html
/d2000-0636.html. In the National Westminster Bank UDRP action, the domain
name natwestsucks.com was registered for the purpose of preventing protesters
from using the site and selling the site to National Westminster Bank at a pre-
mium. The arbitrator concluded that the registrant acted in bad faith in register-
ing the domain name because it was actually motivated by a desire to suppress free
expression and profit by selling the site to the bank. Id.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
32. Id. § 1125(d).
33. Id. § 1125(c) (4). The Federal Trademark Dilution Act does not apply to
noncommercial use of a mark and all forms of news reporting and news commen-
tary. Id. In the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court has defined "com-
mercial speech" as "speech which does no more than propose a commercial trans-
action." Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976). The Congressional Record amply supports that the bill was
not intended to alter existing case law of what constitutes "commercial speech."
H.R.REP. No. 103-374, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, or affect the First Amend-
ment protection afforded to parodies and other forms of noncommercial speech.
141 CONG. REc. S19,312-01 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
("parody, satire, editorial, and other forms of expression will remain unaffected by
this legislation"); 141 CONG. REc. S19,306-10 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Hatch) ("The bill will not prohibit or threaten noncommercial expression,
such as parody, satire, editorial and other forms of expression that are not part of
a commercial transaction."); and 141 CONG. REc. H14,317-01 (daily ed. DEC. 12,
1644 [Vol. 27:3
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fense for "legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain
name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert
consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue."
''
D. Parody
In addition to "cybergriping" sites, parody sites are also popu-
lar on the Internet and a constant source of irritation to the indi-
viduals or companies that are the subject of the sometimes caustic
sites. "Parody is a humorous form of social commentary7 and liter-
ary criticism that dates back as far as Greek antiquity. The Su-
preme Court has observed that "parody has an obvious claim to
transformative value" that, like other forms of criticism, is deserving
36of First Amendment protection.
A parody "must convey two simultaneous-and contradictory-
messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original
and is instead a parody."37 A parody depends on the lack of confu-
sion to make its point.3s The fact that the parody may be coarse or
fail, or that some persons (particularly the person or company who
is the brunt of the parody) may not see the humor does not deprive
the parody of protection.3 9 The fact that the parody is associated
with a product that makes a commercial profit does not strip it of
First Amendment protection. Speech "is protected even though it
is carried in a form that is 'sold' for profit, and even though it may
involve a solicitation to purchase or otherwise pay or contribute
1995) (statement of Rep. Moorehead) (same).
The ACPA requires a finding of "bad faith" in order for the plaintiff to
prevail. The statute provides that "bad faith intent ... shall not be found in any
case in which the court determines that the person believed and had reasonable
grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise
lawful." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1) (B) (ii) (2000).
34. ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, § 4(c)(iii)
(1999), at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (approved Oct.
24, 1999).
35. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987).
36. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
37. Hormel Foods Corp. v.Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 503 (2d Cir.
1996).
38. Id.; see also Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n., 95
F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996);Jordache Enter., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d
1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987); L.L. Bean, Inc., 811 F.2d at 28.
39. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583 ("First Amendment protections do not apply
only to those who speak clearly, whose jokes are funny, and whose parodies suc-
ceed."). Similarly, a parody does not have to label itself as such in order to receive
First Amendment protection. Id. at 583 n.17.
1645
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,,40money.
Because of the wide protection given to speech which is both
nondeceptive and noncommercial, PETA may conduct a parody on
its site of the famous Ronald McDonald character as shown below
and claim full First Amendment protection.
1ek F,,i d feA ~ SeS
~ 1Er e, Tmdeein,
*1 -
SemAr Sh~ ~'r~ I
PETA DISHES UP
112in
Qur I V O.Oj
The average American child eats five hamburgers a week, but
most kids would probably lose their lunch if they knew about -the animal suffering that goes into making McDonald's 'Happy /I
PETA's speech is arguably legitimate commentary about
McDonald's, and the speech is noncommercial in nature. PETA
does not mislead or misdirect McDonald's customers by use of a
deceptive domain name. As a result, McDonald's may be able to do
little under the trademark law because there is no likelihood of
confusion. Likewise, it has little redress under the anti-dilution
statute because commercial use is an essential element of any dilu-
tion claim. Indeed, if you visit the current PETA site41 you will see
that PETA claims its campaign has been successful.
The PETA example can be contrasted with a television com-
mercial in which a competitor of John Deere Company used the
famous John Deere logo. The John Deere logo was made to "leap"
off the John Deere tractor and run away in apparent fear from the
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competitor's tractor. 42 Because this use of the John Deere logo was
clearly in connection with commercial speech, the court had little
difficulty in enjoining this activity.
The precise boundaries of a parody protected by the First
Amendment and one that runs afoul of another's intellectual
property rights are sometimes difficult to draw. The decisions in
this area turn on subtle distinctions between trademark, copyright
and right of publicity law and the role of intellectual property in
our lives. 43 The assertion of "parody" is not a simple answer to a
complex question that is beyond the scope of this article.
E. Prior Restraints
The First Amendment's prohibition against prior restraint of
speech is also alive and well on the Internet. Accordingly, if a
company's trade secrets are being disseminated over the Internet it
may be impossible to halt that activity." The Supreme Court has
long stated that "prior restraints may be issued only in rare and ex-
traordinary circumstances, such as when necessary to prevent the
publication of troop movements during time of war, to prevent the
publication of obscene material and to prevent the overthrow of
the government."4 5 One judge, in an attempt by Ford to restrain an
Internet user from disseminating Ford's trade secrets, bluntly
stated, "private litigants' interest in protecting their vanity or their
commercial self-interest simply does not qualify as grounds for im-
posing a prior restraint."46 Web sites established to criticize busi-
nesses are also protected.47 'Just because speech is critical of a cor-
poration and its business practices is not a sufficient reason to
enjoin the speech."48
IV. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment is alive and well on the Internet. That
does not mean, however, that there are no disputes or that free
42. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1994).
43. White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir.
1993)(Kozinski, CircuitJudge, dissenting). Judge Kozinski describes a broad list
of attempts to stifle creative works through the assertion of intellectual property
rights. Id.
44. Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
45. Near v. Minn. ex. rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
46. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d at 752.
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speech is being universally protected. Litigants with greater finan-
cial resources will always be able to use the heavy cudgel of the le-
gal system to stifle some expression and cause others to impose self-
censorship. The Noerr-Pennington49 doctrine largely undercuts the
ability of a defendant to successfully counter-claim that intellectual
property rights are being asserted in bad faith for the improper
purpose of suppressing speech. UDRP proceedings are being re-
solved dramatically in favor of the established intellectual property
owners and against the domain name holders. ° Justice Frankfurter
observed "freedom of expression is the well-spring of our civiliza-
tion.,,5' The avenues to speech on the Internet are virtually unlim-
ited and efforts to suppress freedom of expression will inevitably
fail in a society founded on that ideal.
49. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 659 (1965);
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 129
(1961). Although Noerr-Pennington originated in the antitrust context, it has been
held to apply to other types of cases, and may be applicable to intellectual prop-
erty misuse claims. There is an exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine known
as the "sham" lawsuit exception, but it is a narrow exception. In Real Estate ProJ'l
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 57 (1993), the Supreme
Court said that in order for the litigation to be a "sham," it must be shown to be
objectively meritless.
50. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) case results, available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/statistics/results.html. As of the end of August
2000, of the 492 completed cases, only fifteen percent were decided in favor of the
domain name holder. Id.
51. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 (1951).
1648 [Vol. 27:3
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